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A LAWYER’S DIVORCE: WILL  
DECENTRALIZED LEDGERS AND SMART 
CONTRACTS SUCCEED IN CUTTING OUT THE 
MIDDLEMAN? 
INTRODUCTION  
Society is progressing at a rapid pace. As math and science evolve, new 
technologies begin to utilize these advances and create something novel. 
These technological changes are revolutionizing not only the science-
oriented industries, but also the humanities. One such example falls within 
the legal arena. More specifically, the exciting advent of smart contracts and 
their use of technological changes are altering the way law is processed and 
practiced.1 However, as is often the case, new technological innovations 
spur certain growing pains. The implementation of smart contracts is 
proving no different.  
Some view the smart contract as the start of a more ideal society.2 With 
the aid of smart contracts and blockchain technology, machines can finally 
be equipped to fulfill some of the most basic human functions.3 Not only 
would business transactions always occur in a timely, seamless, and cost-
effective manner, but also more mundane life tasks, such as ordering 
laundry detergent,4 could soon be done via smart contract technology. As 
                                                 
1. See infra note 4.  
2. See, e.g., Nick Szabo, Smart Contracts: Building Blocks for Digital Markets (1996), http:// 
www.fon.hum.uva.nl/rob/Courses/InformationInSpeech/CDROM/Literature/LOTwinterschool2006/sz
abo.best.vwh.net/smart_contracts_2.html [https://perma.cc/PV8D-RELV]. 
3. Id.  
4. This is just one example of how smart contracts could revolutionize the way our society 
operates. Under this example, the owner of the washing machine and the store would enter into a contract 
prior to any required transaction. This contract would say something like: “If the volume of my laundry 
detergent falls below X level, then charge me for X amount of laundry detergent. If payment is successful, 
then send me X amount of laundry detergent. I authorize you to charge my card for the purchase of new 
detergent every time my washing machine sends you a notification detergent is needed.” After forming 
this type of contract, Szabo’s idea for smart property required some kind of mechanism to be embedded 
inside the washing machine itself. This mechanism would send the signal to a designated store each time 
the detergent fell below the specified threshold. In following the simple “if, then” style, the code to enact 
the smart contract would say “if the detergent falls below one ounce, then order a new bottle shipped 
from X store.” In this example, a smart contract could eliminate a consumer’s likelihood of ever running 
out of laundry detergent. By cutting out the middleman, the smart contract, operating within the washing 
machine itself, would be preauthorized to order detergent when necessary. Thus, this eliminates a 
consumer’s need to ever monitor their levels of detergent. The desirability of such technology becomes 
apparent when applied to other aspects of life. See infra note 14 and accompanying text (discussing this 
technology as applied to the typical “repo man” business model). For more information regarding 
Szabo’s idea of Smart Property and a current example of something similar to smart property, see infra 
note 14.  
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exciting as these changes may be, smart contracts and the blockchain 
technology behind them are still immature.5 Before this legal phenomenon 
is widely accepted, there needs to be more advancement in not only the code 
that creates the technology, but also in the law and its regulations.6 As it 
stands today, smart contracts are most likely to be accepted only in part, and 
heavily tailored to meet each contracting party’s needs.  
This Note will start by giving an overview of the technology needed to 
implement smart contracts—blockchain technology7—and an explanation 
of how smart contracts fit within the framework of a blockchain. Next, this 
Note will discuss some of the major issues smart contracts face. Such issues 
include: the need to translate natural language into computer code, the 
traditional concept of contracting in conjunction with the effect of smart 
contracts on traditional legal notions, and reoccurring enforcement issues. 
After discussing smart contracts and the current issues barring wide-spread 
acceptance, this Note will explore the future of smart contracts in the legal 
arena by analogizing such an electronic contracting change to the now-
widely accepted electronic clickwrap agreements. Additionally, this Note 
will explore recently enacted state statutes that create favorable legal 
conditions for smart contracts and what impact, if any, these statutes may 
have upon federal legislation. Furthermore, this Note will analyze the lack 
of and potential need for regulations regarding smart contracts. In an attempt 
to make smart contracts acceptable, this Note will suggest future regulations 
focus on two components of smart contracts. As it will be discussed, 
regulations should require smart contracts to utilize a permissioned ledger 
and focus on ensuring the legal requirement of mutuality between the two 
contracting parties. Lastly, this Note will conclude that although the 
publicity surrounding smart contracts is exciting and innovative, this form 
of contracting is likely to remain in a controlled business environment with 
implementation under select circumstances. 
  
                                                 
5. Daniel Cawrey, Why Ethereum Needs ‘Dumb’ Contracts, COINDESK (June 29, 2016, 6:50 
PM), https://www.coindesk.com/ethereum-dao-dumb-smart-contracts [https://perma.cc/Q2BS-6XCL]. 
6. See infra Part II.D (highlighting coding failures that have allowed hackers to breach 
blockchain security); infra Part VI (explaining the need for federal regulation of smart contracts to 
minimize parties’ risks). 
7. Blockchain is a type of decentralized ledger technology. See infra Part II.C (explaining how 
blockchain technology works). Although there is much debate concerning the appropriate terminology 
for blockchain/decentralized ledger technology, for the remainder of this Note, the two are considered 
synonymous. Hereinafter decentralized ledger technology will be referred to as blockchain.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol96/iss3/5
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I. OVERVIEW OF THE TECHNOLOGY  
A. What is a smart contract?  
There is no universally accepted definition of a smart contract.8 In the 
mid-1990s, the general concept of a smart contract was broadly construed.9 
For this reason, the smart contract can hold a variety of nuanced meanings.10  
Nick Szabo, widely recognized as the creator of the smart contract 
concept,11 defined a smart contract as “a set of promises, specified in digital 
form, including protocols within which the parties perform on these 
promises.”12 The key focus in this definition is on the idea of new 
technology. For widespread use, Szabo believed that smart contracts needed 
to be embedded within the world.13 In order to embed these smart contracts, 
Szabo suggested placing contractual clauses within everyday pieces of 
hardware, such as cars.14 This could be done by designing a smart contract 
                                                 
8. Jenny Cieplak & Simon Leefatt, Smart Contracts: A Smart Way to Automate Performance, 
1 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 417, 417 (2017). For a comprehensive list of features smart contracts encompass, 
see J. DAX HANSEN & CARLA L. REYES, PERKINS COIE LLP, LEGAL ASPECTS OF SMART CONTRACT 
APPLICATIONS 3 (2017) [https://perma.cc/5WUK-TK4V]. 
9. See NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT, CAN SMART CONTRACTS BE LEGALLY BINDING 
CONTRACTS? 1 (2016) [https://perma.cc/MQN6-JYEM] (finding Szabo’s original idea for smart 
contracts rather broad).  
10. Id. at 4.  
11. Cieplak & Leefatt, supra note 8, at 418.  
12. Szabo, supra note 2. Additionally, Szabo noted that smart contracts were made possible 
because of the advances in digital technology. He was careful to state that smart contracts did not imply 
the use of artificial intelligence; rather, he coined the term “smart” because they were more functional 
than the traditional paper-based contracts. Id. For an example and further understanding on how a more 
complex smart contract operates, see infra Part II.D. 
13. Szabo, supra note 2. 
14. Id. Within the same paper, Szabo also proposed the idea of smart property. This is a more 
technologically advanced concept that runs parallel to smart contracting. Instead of embedding a smart 
contract within the software or hardware, a mechanism is physically placed within the object itself. A 
smart contract is what governs this physical mechanism. For example, Szabo suggested using the smart 
property concept to govern simple tasks such as loan payments on a new car. In this case, the mechanisms 
and smart contracts embedded in the car would determine whether monthly car payments are met. If not 
met, the contractual clause would automatically invoke a lien on the car, which would return legal 
possession of the car to the bank, and lock out the debt holder. Thus, with the exception of the bank, all 
access to the car would be restricted. The bank would then have the legal right to repossess the car. 
Typically, this task has been completed by a repossession agent (commonly known as a “repo man”). 
Perhaps in a more futuristic and technologically-advanced world, the failure to make appropriate 
payments could invoke a car’s embedded smart contract and send the self-driving car back to its rightful 
legal owner (the bank). The benefits of smart property are cost effectiveness: Szabo believed that this 
smart property (in the former example “smart lien”) would be cheaper than a repo man. The 
aforementioned example is a useful way to conceptualize smart contracts and their potentially 
monumental impact on our society. See id. for more discussion of smart property. Additionally, Amazon 
has recently unveiled a new concept, Amazon Dash Replenishment Service (“DRS”). Although DRS is 
similar to the idea of smart property, the DRS does not operate on a blockchain nor does it utilize a smart 
contract. The DRS is a modern example of how concepts, sparked by smart contracts and blockchain, 
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that utilized computer software to decipher the contract’s parameters. The 
computer software would only allow a smart contract to be executed if the 
initial input conditions were met.15 For this reason, a smart contract is 
comprised of simple “if, then” contractual clauses written into whatever 
technological platform is used to complete the transaction.16 Szabo 
recognized that contractual breaches were a major issue impeding the 
advancement of business transactions. Therefore, the goal behind a smart 
contract was to embed, within the software and hardware, contractual 
clauses that make it difficult and expensive for a party to breach the 
agreement.17 Because of the novel technology used to create a smart 
contract, Szabo considered smart contracts more advanced than their 
“inanimate paper-based ancestors.”18   
                                                 
are moving closer to revolutionizing our way of life. See, Dash Replenishment Service, AMAZON, https:// 
developer.amazon.com/dash-replenishment-service [https://perma.cc/YS52-JUMG]. See also, Michelle 
Evans, Machines Will Know What You Need to Buy, But Are Retailers Ready?, FORBES (Jul 11, 2018, 
11:26 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/michelleevans1/2018/07/31/machines-will-know-what-you-
need-to-buy-but-are-retailers-ready [https://perma.cc/G2JZ-DVZH] (describing upcoming changes to 
the retail market which mimic the smart property idea); Wagz Integrates Amazon Dash Replenishment 
into new Serve Smart Feeder that Automatically Reorders and Ships Pet Food Right to Your Door, 
CISION PR NEWSWIRE (May 23, 2018, 7:40 AM), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/wagz-int 
egrates-amazon-dash-replenishment-into-new-serve-smart-feeder-that-automatically-reorders-and-shi 
ps-pet-food-right-to-your-door-300653490.html [https://perma.cc/X79C-KPGZ] (although not 
operating on blockchain, this provides an example of a self-ordering pet food bowl, which mimics 
Szabo’s idea of smart property).  
15. See NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT, supra note 10, at 7 (using a vending machine as an example 
to show that once coins are submitted, the smart contract enacts predetermined and irrevocable 
outcomes).  
16. For a more complete discussion of preexisting technology that could easily utilize a smart 
contract, see Szabo, supra note 2. In 1996, Szabo suggested that the following types of technology could 
benefit from a smart contract: Point of Sale terminals and cards, Electronic Data Interchange used 
predominantly for transactions between corporations, and the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial 
Telecommunication (SWIFT), Automated Clearing House (ACH), and FedWire to transfer and clear 
payments between banks. More recently, many other forms of technology can, and will soon, benefit 
from the use of blockchain technology. See Lucas Mearian, Blockchain will be the killer app for supply 
chain management in 2018, COMPUTERWORLD (May 8, 2018, 2:55 PM), https://www.computerworld. 
com/article/3249252/emerging-technology/blockchain-will-be-the-killer-app-for-supply-chain-manage 
ment-in-2018.html [https://perma.cc/44VF-PXFF] (discussing blockchain technology and its 
advantages to the global shipping industry and overall supply chain management); Hugo Evans & 
Stephen Easton, The Future of Procurement Arrives at Last, ATKEARNEY, https://www.atkearney. 
com/procurement/article?/a/the-future-of-procurement-arrives-at-last [https://perma.cc/W797-QLK4] 
(discussing the rationales and need for blockchain technology in the procurement process).  
17. Nick Szabo, Formalizing and Securing Relationships on Public Networks, 2 FIRST MONDAY 
(1997) [https://perma.cc/4GN9-Q48G]. 
18. Szabo, supra note 2. Szabo frequently used the vending machine as an example of a 
“primitive ancestor of [a] smart contract[].” Id. A vending machine revolves around the smart contract 
concept because the machine takes the input (the coins), determines when the appropriate amount is 
rendered, and then uses a simple mechanism to digest the coins and deliver the product (the soda). 
Although the vending machine is similar to smart contracts in its overall concept (both operate on simple 
“if, then” scenarios), it is more rudimentary in key aspects. A smart contract usually entails synchronous 
steps involving multiple parties. Unlike a typical smart contract, the vending machine is only concerned 
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Although the smart contract concept can have many different definitions, 
Szabo’s ideas spurred scholarship that eventually reached a consensus 
regarding key characteristics of any smart contract. For one, a smart contract 
is always in digital form and contains embedded contractual clauses.19 
Normally, these contractual clauses are written in the form of computer 
code. Additionally, the performance of a smart contract is always mediated 
by technology.20 This means that payments and other actions within the 
contractual clauses are governed by rules-based operations on technological 
platforms. Essentially, there is no longer a need for the middleman. 
Furthermore, smart contracts are meant to be irrevocable.21 Once a 
stipulated condition is met, the performance encoded within the smart 
contract cannot be stopped.22  
B. How Blockchain and Smart Contracts Coexist  
The recent invention of specialized technology has made smart contracts 
possible.23 However, this was not always the case. Szabo’s concept of smart 
contracts remained in the beta stage from the mid-1990s until the invention 
of the first digital coin, Bitcoin, in 2008.24 The growing interest in Bitcoin 
and the technology on which it was built—blockchain—ignited numerous 
research and development projects regarding its practical application.25  
                                                 
with one relationship—the relationship between the vending company and the customer. Thus, the 
vending machine is a prime example of how a simple “if, then” smart contract operates. Id. 
19. Id.  
20. NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT, supra note 10, at 7. 
21. Id. A smart contract’s irrevocability is the most controversial characteristic, perhaps, because 
this feature is a grave departure from traditional contracting. Although traditional contracts were created 
with the purpose of lasting, lawsuits and judicial interpretation could always create an “easy out,” if 
desired. However, no such “easy out” exists with smart contracts. Instead, everything is automated 
behind the scenes with new and rapidly evolving technology. Id. Perhaps some of the fear surrounding 
smart contracting stems from a level of discomfort that tends to surface when dealing with new and not-
fully-understood technology. Thus, the irrevocability characteristic makes smart contracts permanent; 
whereas, traditional contracting is only permanent when both parties desire it. This combination of new 
technology and permanency creates controversy.  
22. Id.  
23. See supra Part I.A.  
24. NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT, supra note 10, at 8. See also Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-
to-Peer Electronic Cash System, BITCOIN.ORG (2008), https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
3U88-DR68]. 
25. See HANSEN & REYES supra note 8, at 3 (describing a smart contract’s broad definition and 
hypothesizing that technologists and businesses will find new and revolutionary ways to use smart 
contracts and their encompassing technology). It is important to note the blockchains used for Bitcoin 
and Ethereum operate in two different manners. Under Bitcoin, the blockchain is being used to support 
a digital currency. However, under Ethereum, the blockchain is being used to run an open-ended 
decentralized software platform. It is because of this flexible platform that Ethereum, but not Bitcoin, is 
able to support smart contracts. See Prableen Bajpai, Bitcoin Vs Ethereum: Driven by Different Purposes, 
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Blockchain is the checking mechanism that facilitates and verifies 
transactions. Because of its versatility, blockchain can easily be adapted to 
verify any transaction, so long as it is translated into computer code. Two 
key features of smart contracts include automation and self-regulation via 
technology.26 Smart contracts were able to obtain these features through the 
use of blockchain. Because blockchain acts as a checking mechanism, this 
self-regulation removes the human element, commonly referred to as the 
middleman. This removal has the benefit of streamlining the contracting 
process, lowering the likelihood of human error, and creating a more cost-
effective option.27  
Assuming all preliminary conditions are met, the machine using a smart 
contract will ensure performance on the contract’s terms.28 However, just 
like in traditional contracting, the initial terms of a smart contract must be 
interpreted and verified.29 In traditional contracting, this is done by a human 
or, in some cases, a judge. Unlike traditional contracting, smart contracts 
utilize the third-party computer-based process, blockchain, to verify the 
occurrence of a contract’s terms.30 
C. A General Discussion on Blockchain Technology  
As mentioned above, blockchain is a necessity for any smart contract. 
For that reason, this Note requires a brief discussion on the technology and 
how it operates. 
Blockchain contains a decentralized ledger that anonymously tracks and 
creates a record of transactions pertaining to that ledger.31 A block is created 
for each transaction. The ledger is responsible for containing a complete and 
continuous record (the “chain”) of all transactions.32 Each transaction 
equates to a “block;” however, these blocks are only added to the blockchain 
if the “nodes” reach a consensus that the block (the transaction) is valid.33   
                                                 
INVESTOPEDIA (July 13, 2018 6:00 AM), https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/031416/bitco 
in-vs-ethereum-driven-different-purposes.asp [https://perma.cc/W3WZ-CFMZ]. 
26. See supra Part I.A.  
27. Max Raskin, The Law and Legality of Smart Contracts, 1 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 305, 316 
(2017). See also Cieplak & Leefatt, supra note 8, at 420.  
28. Raskin, supra note 27, at 316.  
29. Id. at 322.  
30. HANSEN & REYES, supra note 8, at 2.  
31. Cieplak & Leefatt, supra note 8. See also HANSEN & REYES, supra note 8, at 2.  
32. JOHN MCKINLAY ET AL., DLA PIPER, BLOCKCHAIN: BACKGROUND, CHALLENGES, AND 
LEGAL ISSUES 5 (2017), https://www.dlapiper.com/en/uk/insights/publications/2017/06/blockchain-bac 
kground-challenges-legal-issues/ [https://perma.cc/955V-9FAX].  
33. Id.  
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One of the most notable features of a blockchain is its ability to exist 
simultaneously across a network of computers.34 In order to record and 
check the accuracy of each transaction within the blockchain, the ledger 
must be replicated and distributed among multiple parties.35 These parties, 
commonly referred to as “nodes,”36 are often anonymous third-party 
members of the blockchain network.37 The process of checking a 
transaction’s validity requires a high level of computing power: “‘miner’ 
nodes compete with each other to solve a highly complex algorithm’”38 
which, if proven, will verify the transaction’s validity.39 The first miner 
node to solve the algorithm, thus verifying the transaction’s validity, is 
rewarded.40 Each block usually contains the following four pieces of 
information: a “hash” from the previous block, a summary of the actual 
transaction, a time stamp, and the verification of the transaction.41  
Additionally, the blockchain network is decentralized, which has the 
primary benefit of making the technology hard to hack by eliminating the 
one centralized point of vulnerability.42 Because blockchain lacks a 
centralized point, the ledger needs to be self-maintaining.43 This is possible, 
in part, because each block contains the hash of the previous block.44 This 
means that each current block is tied to the previous one, making any 
attempt by hackers to alter the transaction post-validation easily detected.45 
Despite the lack of diversity in terms of a technological platform, a party 
to a smart contract still maintains choices regarding the design of the 
blockchain technology. Smart contracts can utilize a permissionless or 
permissioned ledger, or a hybrid of the two.46 A permissionless distributed 
                                                 
34. What is Blockchain Technology? A Step-By-Step Guide for Beginners, BLOCKGEEKS, https:// 
blockgeeks.com/guides/what-is-blockchain-technology/ [https://perma.cc/P54D-T2X9]. 
35. Cieplak & Leefatt, supra note 8, at 420–21. Either the entire ledger or parts of the ledger can 
be distributed to nodes. The choice depends on whether only certain portions are relevant to certain 
nodes. Either way, the distributed copy is still considered the original. This is because rules require all 
modifications or changes to the ledger (i.e. an asset changing hands or a transaction being created or 
modified) to be broadcasted to all existing copies of the ledger. See id. at 421.  
36. For a helpful diagram of how blockchain works, see supra note 34; MCKINLAY ET AL., supra 
note 32, at 6. For an illustrative example using the a blockchain process, see Smart Contracts, 
BLOCKCHAINHUB, https://blockchainhub.net/smart-contracts/ [https://perma.cc/FUG9-5MAY]. 
37. MCKINLAY ET AL., supra note 32, at 5. 
38. Id. 
39. If utilizing Bitcoin’s Blockchain, this is called the “proof of work.” Id.  
40. Again, if this is on Bitcoin’s Blockchain, then such a miner node will be compensated in 
Bitcoin. For this reason, this action has also been referred to as “mining for Bitcoin.” Id.  
41. Id. at 7.  
42. Id. 
43. Id.  
44. Id. at 5.  
45. Id.  
46. NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT, supra note 10, at 11. It is also important to note that a party may 
“choose” whether the status of the contract is legally binding or legally enforceable. Although the Norton 
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ledger allows anyone “to download the software, submit messages for 
processing and/or be involved in the process of authentication, verification 
and reaching consensus.”47 Permissionless distributed ledgers are open to 
anyone and usually lack a designated leader.48 Typically, this type of ledger 
utilizes blockchain’s public proof-of-work method.49  
Unlike the permissionless ledger, a permissioned ledger is private. The 
participants in a permissioned ledger must be either pre-selected, approved 
by an administrator of the ledger, or granted entry once the participant 
satisfies certain requirements.50 Unlike the public proof-of-work method 
typically used in permissionless ledgers, permissioned ledgers make use of 
either a consensus protocol, an administrator, or sub-group of participants 
when deciding whether to update the ledger.51 Thus, permissioned ledgers, 
in contrast to permissionless ledgers, contain a feature resembling a 
centralized body.52 
A third alternative to the permissionless or permissioned ledger is to 
create a hybrid of the two, which can incorporate a variety of variables. 
Usually these variables relate to the level of centralization within the 
ledger.53 For example, a hybrid ledger can stem from a permissionless-type 
ledger that opts to use an encryption code to protect the transactions.54 Such 
a hybrid allows anyone to download the ledger; however, only those with a 
                                                 
Rose Fulbright White Paper implies that a party actually has a choice in the contract’s legality, in reality, 
it is generally a choice of whether or not to add an arbitration clause. Because arbitration clauses are still 
subject to the discretion of a court for enforcement, this option may help the enforceability of a smart 
contract but it does not offer a concrete method ensuring the contract’s enforceability. Additionally, a 
party may have a choice as to the “consensus protocol over which participants reach agreement over 
facts.” Id. However, this option is more of an issue for the technologists because it pertains to the code 
utilized. Therefore, this Note will not discuss this option any further. 
47. Id.  
48. Id. The permissioned ledger, or some form of a hybrid, will likely be the preferred ledger for 
corporations and business transactions. Unlike a permissionless ledger, permissioned ledgers offer 
heightened security and anonymity that is more conducive to confidential and sensitive business 
dealings. Id. at 12.  
49. Id. at 11. Essentially, proof-of-work is the term for the process through which blockchain 
technology verifies transactions. In layman’s terms, proof-of-work is defined as “a requirement that 
expensive computations . . . be performed in order to facilitate transactions on the blockchain.” 
Aleksandr Bulkin, Explaining blockchain—how proof of work enables trustless consensus, KEEPING 
STOCK (May 3, 2016), https://keepingstock.net/explaining-blockchain-how-proof-of-work-enables-tru 
stless-consensus-2abed27f0845 [https://perma.cc/F37X-A7PQ]. For the original, albeit highly technical, 
discussion of proof-of-work, see Nakamoto, supra note 24, at 3.  
50. NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT, supra note 10, at 11. Such requirements include anti-money 
laundering provisions and proof a participant knows the client. Id. 
51. Id.  
52. For a visual depiction of permissioned and permissionless ledgers and their varying degrees 
of centralization see id. at 12.  
53. Id. at 11.  
54. Id. 
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cryptographic key are able to look at the individual transactions within the 
blockchain.55  
The blockchain technology and the choices afforded to its users, such 
as permissioned, permissionless, and hybrid ledgers, are crucial to the 
future of smart contracts.56 The use of blockchain allows a smart contract 
to be both self-verifying and fully automated. Not only do these features 
make potential contractual breaches more difficult, but they also make 
contracting with smart contracts cost effective.57 By inputting the 
contractual terms into a blockchain, the nodes are able to check whether 
certain terms have been met. If the nodes find such terms valid, then the 
conditional contractual terms are triggered and the smart contract is 
performed.58 Conversely, if the nodes are not able to verify the initial 
contractual terms, then the block is not formed and the contract is not 
performed.59  
II. GENERAL ISSUES IMPEDING THE IMPLEMENTATION AND ENFORCEMENT 
OF SMART CONTRACTS 
A. Translating Natural Language into Computer Code and Incurred 
Complications 
As discussed earlier, the smart contract concept encompasses a variety 
of definitions.60 Although flexibility can be a benefit, it has presented some 
issues regarding the implementation of smart contracts.61 The spectrum of 
                                                 
55. Id. 
56. Although other methods to verify a transaction exist, blockchain technology has garnered 
more attention and capital than the rest. Therefore, this particular technology has been dubbed “the one 
to work with.” See Raskin, supra note 27, at 308 n.8.  
57. For this reason, the use of blockchain allows a smart contract to achieve Szabo’s initial goal 
of reducing the probability of a contractual breach by erecting barriers to protect against a potential 
breach. 
58. Some smart contracts use oracles when determining whether certain contractual terms have 
been met. Typically, oracles are used in smart contract systems that are deterministic. A deterministic 
system relies on outside information when determining whether certain contractual terms have been met. 
Oracles are used in such systems as a way for the smart contracts to interact with the real world. Thus, 
oracles are “trusted entities which sign claims about the state of the world. Since the verification of 
signatures can be done deterministically, it allows deterministic smart contracts to react to the (non-
deterministic) outside world.” Stefan Thomas & Evan Schwartz, Smart Oracles: A Simple, Powerful 
Approach to Smart Contracts, CODIUS (July 18, 2014), https://github.com/codius/codius-wiki/wiki/ 
White-Paper [https://perma.cc/S6KW-942X]. For a potential application of oracles and smart contracts 
with interest rate swaps, see Cieplak & Leefatt, supra note 8, at 423.  
59. See MCKINLAY ET AL., supra note 32, at 5 (“[A] block is only added to the chain if the nodes 
. . . reach consensus on the next ‘valid’ block to be added to the chain.”).  
60. Supra Part I.A. 
61. NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT, supra note 10, at 13. As addressed above, smart contracts heavily 
rely on technology. Many of the issues impacting widespread acceptance of smart contracts rest on the 
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definitions can range from one extreme, where the code itself is the contract, 
to another extreme, where the contract consists almost wholly of natural 
language. In the latter example, only smaller features, such as the payment 
mechanism, would be automated through the code.62  
In addition to these rather polarizing options for smart contract 
implementation, there are some intermediate possibilities. These options 
include duplicating the translation of the smart contract into both code and 
natural language,63 or a hybrid version that utilizes code to carry out the 
performance for non-human provisions and natural language for human 
performance provisions. In all the above examples, both the code and 
natural language aspects work together to create a unified contract.64  
Given the above-mentioned options, the idea that a smart contract should 
allow the natural language to be wholly replaced with computer code poses 
some issues. Such an extreme leaves many unanswered questions. For one, 
how can it be verified that the parties to the contract are defining key 
contractual terms in the same manner?65 The English language consists of 
many words, but computer code has a significantly smaller vocabulary.66 
Other questions include determining whether it is possible to ensure that all 
exceptions contained in the contract are identified by the computer coders.67 
If so, is there certainty that all the parameters, contained in the natural 
language, are seamlessly translated into the code?68 Even if all the above 
questions are answered in the affirmative, there remains yet another 
unanswered question: Is it possible to make sure the code is actually 
executed?69 Computer glitches are common, and delay of contract 
performance has the potential to cost the contracting parties lots of money. 
                                                 
immaturity of the code and/or technology itself. However, the intricacies of the code are best left to the 
technologists; thus, they are outside of the scope of this Note. 
62. Id.  
63. This would mean that every line of code has a corresponding natural language clause. 
Although duplicative, this could help create a working smart contract while allowing both parties the 
opportunity to review and understand the contract’s actual terms. However, this suggestion runs into the 
same problems as a full translation of the natural language into code. For more discussion on this issue, 
see infra Part II.A. 
64. NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT, supra note 10, at 13. Hybrid contracts are commonly referred to 
as “split” contracts. Id.  
65. CHRISTOPHER D. CLACK ET AL., SMART CONTRACT TEMPLATES: FOUNDATIONS, DESIGN 
LANDSCAPE AND RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 10 (Aug. 4, 2016), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1608.00771.pdf [https: 
//perma.cc/T3J5-DZAH].  
66. Raskin, supra note 27 at 324–25 .  
67. See CLACK ET AL. supra note 65 at 11 (“Another challenge is whether such a contract, written 
in a computer-like language, would be admissible in court as a true and faithful representation of the 
intentions of the parties.”).  
68. Id.  
69. Id. 
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Even though smart contracts generally offer great benefits,70 such 
technological risks that arise from an attempt to fully translate a contract’s 
natural language into computer code could limit a smart contract’s 
economic benefits.  
In an attempt to remedy some of these technological issues, advocates 
for smart contracts have proposed creating a standard language to help ease 
the process of translating natural language into code.71 One such language 
is called Common Language for Augmented Contract Knowledge 
(CLACK).72 Unlike traditional contracting, where the contract is read as a 
whole in order to interpret and hypothesize the intent of the parties, the 
authors of CLACK hoped this language would help reduce ambiguity by 
making any contractual meaning easily deducible.73 CLACK was created to 
propose a simple and natural solution to the above-mentioned translation 
issues.74 Instead of using traditional legal language, CLACK proposes that 
lawyers use the CLACK language to draft contracts.75 In theory, CLACK 
would eliminate the ambiguity that may arise from nuanced word choices 
and social norms.76 However, creating a standardized language to 
understand a different, and rather foreign language—the computer code 
itself—is a cumbersome solution to translating natural language into code. 
Yet, solutions like CLACK are one viable possibility towards advancing the 
use of smart contracts.  
Other issues arise when the natural language of a contract is translated 
into computer code. For example, contract interpretation, usually done with 
the help of a judge, must now be done through the computer code. Typically, 
the process of contract interpretation involves the determination of fact-
specific questions that require judgment calls and vary in degree.77 In 
traditional contracting, this interpretation has been done with the help of a 
judge who carries the power of legal enforcement.78 Although one of the 
main goals behind smart contracting is to eliminate the intermediaries, the 
                                                 
70. See supra Part I. These benefits include cost effectiveness via streamlining the contracting 
process by eliminating the middleman.  
71. See CLACK ET AL., supra note 65, at 11 (arguing that the creation of a formal language would 
eliminate ambiguity and the resulting language would be simple and easy to use).  
72. See Dr. Chris Clack, Senior Lecturer, Univ. Coll. London, Smart Legal Contracts: Prose, 
Parameters, Code, Presentation at the Smart Contract Templates Summit (June 29, 2016) [https://perma. 
cc/YJV4-4WL5]; see also CLACK ET AL., supra note 65 at 13 n.8.  
73. CLACK ET AL., supra note 65, at 11. 
74. Id.  
75. Id. 
76. Id. 
77. NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT, supra note 10, at 14. 
78. Examples of potential questions that are commonly litigated in contract disputes and require 
legal judgment include whether the adverse change is material; whether best efforts were used to execute 
the contract; whether these efforts were reasonable; and whether there was a good faith effort. Id.  
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process of determining questions that vary in degree is difficult to complete 
merely through computer code.79  
B. The Difficulties with Determining Whether and How Smart Contracts 
Fit Within Our Traditional Legal Notions  
Another issue impeding the implementation of smart contracts relates to 
the fundamental notion of what constitutes a smart contract and how to best 
make sense of smart contracting in lieu of traditional contracting. The 
advent of technology has complicated not only our notion of traditional 
contracting but also our idea, use, and implementation of smart contracts. 
Such complications include the application of traditional notions of 
contracting to smart contracts. Despite the differences between traditional 
and smart contracting, it is best not to debate whether traditional notions 
apply; rather, it is more suitable to consider how these traditional principles 
apply.80 Given what will be discussed later, it is unlikely that the mere 
electronic nature of smart contracts will impede their development.81 
Instead, the uncertainty and abstract form new technology can take are 
concepts more likely to present greater issues. Specifically, questions about 
what constitutes the contractual terms, along with other tangential technical 
requirements necessary to implement the smart contract form, are likely to 
pose enforceability and jurisdictional problems.  
C. Reoccurring Enforcement Issues 
Lastly, actual enforceability remains an issue for smart contracts. In 
general, contracts require enforcement in order to serve a purpose. 
Therefore, the goal for any form of contracting should be legal 
enforcement.82 Unfortunately, smart contracts face some roadblocks in the 
enforcement arena. By their nature, smart contracts lack a central 
administrating authority. Although the lack of a centralized decision maker 
may have its benefits, such as cost-effectiveness, efficiency, and 
streamlining the contracting process, the lack of a centralized body also 
                                                 
79. Id.  
80. Id. at 15.  
81. Id. Later, this Note compares smart contracting to the once-contentious concept of electronic 
clickwrap agreements. See infra Part III. Clickwrap agreements are a form of electronic contracting that 
has become widely accepted by courts and consumers. See id. Like clickwrap agreements, smart 
contracts will become more commonplace. Because smart contracts are fundamentally similar to 
clickwrap agreements, the fact that smart contracts are electronic should not itself be problematic.  
82. See infra Part VI.  
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means that there is no immediate authority to resolve disputes.83 
Additionally, a main tenet of blockchain technology is anonymity. Yet, if 
the parties’ identities are unknown, then there can be no clear defendant. 
This makes malfeasance difficult to remedy.84 Moreover, the contract itself 
can pose some enforceability issues: if the contract is the code, when did the 
contract become legally binding? There are two possible answers: when the 
contractual terms were agreed upon or when the initial contractual terms 
were met.85 The aforementioned questions have no concrete answers, and 
this uncertainty has created some overarching issues smart contracts must 
face before acceptance is possible. 
D. A Cautionary Tale: The DAO Hack, an Example of the Difficulties 
Surrounding Enforcement of Smart Contracts 
Since the mid-1990s, the idea of smart contracts has created excitement 
and anticipation. Unfortunately, all this excitement may have rushed the 
implementation of a complex smart contract. With the advent of blockchain 
technology Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs) have 
become a new tool for crowdsourcing investments.86 In June 2016, a hacker 
attacked a DAO, utilizing a blockchain based smart contract, and stole in 
excess of $70 million USD. This hacking incident87 explores a common 
question: what happens when the blockchain technology works but the code 
and the contractual clauses are faulty?88 When considering what it takes to 
                                                 
83. A centralized body could become helpful when determining whether code defects are a 
liability issue for the creator of the code or the nodes. See MCKINLAY ET AL., supra note 32, at 8–10.  
84. Likewise, given the format of blockchain, this anonymity makes it difficult to disseminate 
and enforce a court award. Id. 
85. Id. at 19–20. The referenced White Paper suggests placing a dispute resolution clause within 
the contract itself in order to help make the smart contract enforceable. Although this may help, other 
issues such as debate surrounding the true meaning of contract terms or the point at which the contract 
actually existed, may still persist.  
86. Antonio Madeira, The DAO, The Hack, The Soft Fork and The Hard Fork, CRYPTOCOMPARE 
(July 30, 2018), https://www.cryptocompare.com/coins/guides/the-dao-the-hack-the-soft-fork-and-the-
hard-fork/ [https://perma.cc/BGA2-HD87]. For more information on the structure of the DAO and the 
hack, see Siegel, infra note 88. 
87. See Klint Finley, A $50 Million Hack Just Showed That The DAO Was All Too Human, 
WIRED (June 18, 2016, 4:30 AM), https://www.wired.com/2016/06/50-million-hack-just-showed-dao-
human/ [https://perma.cc/SP6L-WTU5]; Rob Price, Digital currency Ethereum is cratering because of 
a $50 million hack, BUS. INSIDER (June 17, 2016, 5:34 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/dao-
hacked-ethereum-crashing-in-value-tens-of-millions-allegedly-stolen-2016-6 [https://perma.cc/5XT6-
A9LS].  
88. It is important to note that the Ethereum blockchain itself was not, and has never been, 
hacked. Ethereum blockchain continues to support and execute many other smart contracts. Rather, the 
June 2016 hack was based on a recursive flaw in the smart contract’s code. David Siegel, Understanding 
the DAO Attack, COINDESK (June 25, 2016, 4:00 AM), https://www.coindesk.com/understanding-dao-
hack-journalists [https://perma.cc/C8WL-BW6Y]. 
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achieve widespread use, it is important to review past errors in order to 
create future remedies. The 2016 hack serves as a cautionary tale for why 
mature and tested technologies are necessary before smart contracts can 
achieve widespread acceptance.    
In May 2016, a DAO, called the Genesis DAO, was created with the 
purpose of operating a venture capital fund for cryptocurrencies.89 Under 
the structure of a DAO, users invest their cryptocurrency, Ether, into a pool. 
In exchange, the users are able to vote on how the Ether pool is invested.90 
Theoretically, the benefits of using a DAO, which lacks any centralized 
authority, are two-fold: reduced costs and increased control over 
investments.91  
The Genesis DAO revolved around a complex smart contract built on 
Ethereum blockchain. With the help of a smart contract, investors were able 
to send Ether and vote on possible investments.92 Under the Genesis DAO 
structure, if a selected proposal reached a twenty percent quorum, then the 
DAO would initiate the investment on behalf of the pooled investors. 
However, investors were not bound to any specific investment.93 The DAO 
included a special “exit door” or “split function” that could be triggered by 
any investor who felt an investment may damage their portfolio.94 Thus, this 
exit door allowed users to leave the DAO. Once the exit door was initiated, 
the users would receive their remaining Ether.95  
Although the invention of this DAO seemed promising, just two months 
after its inception, the advancement was forced to take one giant step back. 
On June 18, 2016, a hacker entered the “impenetrable” DAO through the 
smart contract’s exit door policy.96 A clever malfeasant user exploited a 
                                                 
89. See Siegel, supra note 88. The Genesis DAO was an immediate hit. By the end of the funding 
period the DAO far surpassed its creator’s expectations, raising in excess of $150 million USD.  
90. Id.  
The DAO had a creation period during which anyone was allowed to send Ether to a special 
wallet address in exchange for DAO tokens on a 1–100 scale. The creation period was an 
unforeseen success as it managed to gather 12.7 Ether (worth around $150M USD at the time), 
making it the biggest crowdfund ever. At some point, when Ether was trading at $20, the total 
Ether from the DAO was worth over $250 million.  
Madeira, supra note 86.   
91. See Siegel, supra note 88. It is important to note that under the structure of a DAO, investors 
only gain voting rights and not ownership of the DAO. The DAO is simply software that runs on the 
Ethereum network. Id.  
92. Madeira, supra note 86. 
93. Id.  
94. Id. 
95. Id. When an investor left the DAO, a “child DAO” was created, and the investor’s remaining 
money would be sent to that child DAO after a twenty-eight-day waiting period. The investor would 
then be able to access their remaining Ether through their child DAO. Id.  
96. Id. Even before the hack happened, some investors pointed out the flaws in the smart 
contract’s code. On June 12, 2016, six days before the hack, Stephan Tual, a creator of the DAO, 
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flaw in the smart contract’s recursive code. This flaw allowed the hacker to 
repeatedly request an exit. Each time an exit was requested, Ether was sent 
to a “child” DAO.97 In effect, the hacker’s repeated exits continually sent 
Ether to this child DAO before the Genesis DAO was able to register the 
original exit, update the total remaining Ether, and cut off the transactions.98 
In a matter of hours, the hacker drained the DAO of 3.6 million Ether. At 
the date of the hack, this amount was valued at approximately $70 million 
USD.99   
One of the reasons why the DAO was unable to force the hacker to 
replace the stolen Ether stems from the purpose of Ethereum, which is a 
form of popular blockchain technology predominantly utilized for smart 
contracts.100 Similar to other forms of blockchain technology, the Ethereum 
system is designed to prevent transactions from being undone.101 
Blockchain programing is “intrinsically unrevertible.”102 As discussed 
above, the goal for smart contracting is to create a contract that is 
irrevocable and automated.103 When these two features are combined and 
the smart contract is initiated, the reality becomes an irreversible smart 
contract with potential code flaws for users to exploit. The DAO hack, in 
combination with the purpose of Ethereum and smart contracting, highlights 
one reason why smart contracts can create risky situations for their users. 
                                                 
announced the presence of a “recursive call bug;” however, he mistakenly believed that none of the 
DAO funds were at risk. Siegel, supra note 88. 
97. Madeira, supra note 86. 
98. See Haseeb Qureshi, A hacker stole $31M of Ether—how it happened, and what it means for 
Ethereum, FREECODECAMP (July 20, 2017), https://medium.freecodecamp.org/a-hacker-stole-31m-of-
ether-how-it-happened-and-what-it-means-for-ethereum-9e5dc29e33ce [https://perma.cc/DCS8-SDE 
C].  
99. Madeira, supra note 86. This hack was a major setback for the DAO. Because the DAO 
controlled approximately fifteen percent of all Ether, any failure could negatively impact the entire 
Ethereum network. For these reasons, the creators of the DAO had a strong incentive to remedy the hack 
as soon as possible. In an attempt to remedy the situation, the creators had to quickly choose between a 
soft-fork and a hard-fork option for the code. Under the soft-fork option, Vitalik Buterin of the Ethereum 
Foundation proposed “install[ing] a ‘switch’ in the basic [E]thereum code that [would prevent] moving 
any ether out of the DAO or its children.” Siegel, supra note 88. The hard-fork option was much more 
aggressive. Under the hard-fork, “the miners [would] completely unwind the theft and return all Ether 
to [t]he DAO, where it [could] be redeemed by token holders automatically, thereby ending [t]he DAO.” 
Id. The hard-fork option was chosen. For more discussion on the public’s sentiment regarding both the 
soft-fork and hard-fork options, see id. 
100. Id. Additionally, the DAO was also unable to recognize the flaw because of the way the smart 
contract’s code was structured. The code allowed the Ether to be removed before updating the total Ether 
in the DAO. Because of this structural issue, Ether was able to exit the DAO before the DAO actually 
registered the previous action and updated the total Ether. Qureshi, supra note 98.  
101. Cieplak & Leefatt, supra note 8, at 425.  
102. Qureshi, supra note 98.  
103. See supra Part I.A. 
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In addition to the faulty recursive code, the 2016 hack also demonstrates 
the difficulties in achieving a suitable remedy for a smart contract hack. 
Ethereum is based on a permissionless public blockchain, which means 
parties remain anonymous.104 Due to the anonymity of all parties involved 
in the Genesis DAO, there is a possibility that the identity of the hacker will 
never be known.105 Initially, anonymity was considered a positive attribute 
of blockchain; however, this hack shows the difficulty in pursuing litigation 
under an anonymous system. Such a system can leave those harmed without 
any form of remedy. Without an identifiable defendant, it would be difficult 
for a plaintiff to pursue a suit for damages.106 Thus, going against all notions 
of fairness and justice, the injured party remains injured.107  
Eventually, the ending for the Genesis DAO was a bit different. The 
DAO investors were repaid for their loss, but it came at a great cost. The 
DAO was forced to make a “hard fork” split in the code. In effect, this hard 
fork created two Ethereum blockchains with two separate codes and 
incompatible cryptocurrencies.108 Because these cryptocurrencies are 
incompatible, the value of Ether is now split.109 In addition to causing a loss 
in Ether value, the hack and forced hard fork cost blockchain technologies 
and smart contracts public confidence.110  
                                                 
104. For more discussion on permissionless ledgers and public proof-of-work see supra Part I.C.  
105. Although some commentators initially thought there was enough information available to 
uncover the hacker’s identity, over two years have passed and the hacker’s identity is still unknown. See 
Siegel, supra note 88 (stating his initial thought that others would discover the hacker’s identity soon 
after the hack). See also Burgess Powell, Ethereum (ETH) vs Ethereum Classic (ETC): What Are the 
Differences?, BLOCKLR (Oct. 4, 2018), https://blocklr.com/guides/ethereum-eth-vs-ethereumclassic-
etc/ [https://perma.cc/Y3TD-E4K3] (a recent reference to “an anonymous hacker”). 
106. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(a)(1)(B) (“A summons must: be directed to the defendant”), 4(b) (“[o]n 
or after filing the complaint, the plaintiff may present a summons to the clerk . . . for service on the 
defendant.”) These sections of Rule 4 prove that in order to both file and issue a proper complaint, the 
defendant must be identifiable. Without meeting the aforementioned requirements, cases are dismissed. 
Id. Furthermore, there is uncertainty as to whether the hacker could be held legally liable for stealing the 
Ether. Because the smart contract code encompassed the legal terms for the DAO investment agreement, 
the code itself is therefore the law. In fact, after the attack, the hacker wrote a letter to the DAO and 
Ethereum community claiming that the stolen Ether was his/hers. Siegel, supra note 88. For this reason, 
the hacker could potentially argue the repeated exercise of the recursive exit option was a legal 
possibility provided by the code. Under such rationale, the Ether was not stolen, merely legally 
reallocated. Id. For a similar concern, see Cawrey, supra note 5.  
107. For an argument discussing the impact the lack of smart contract regulation has on plaintiffs, 
see infra Part VI. 
108. Siegel, supra note 88.  
109. The hard fork split Ethereum into two different cryptocurrencies—Ethereum and Ethereum 
Classic. As a result of this split, the two Ethereums are founded on different ideologies and blockchains. 
For further discussion on the two forms of Ethereum and how this has affected their respected values 
see Powell, supra note 105.  
110. The diminished public confidence is shown through the drop in the price of Ether. As a result 
of the hack, the Ether price went from $20 to $13. Id.  
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The DAO hack is an example of what can happen when the code is not 
“exhaustively tested for every potential outcome.”111 Even though the DAO 
originally held great promise, the hack was a rude awakening to Szabo’s 
hope that smart contracts will become a staple in modern society.112 The 
hack has left users with diminished confidence in the current form of the 
technology,113 which has effectively shattered the buzz and excitement 
surrounding smart contracts. As this case exemplifies, the smart contract 
technology is immature and not yet ready for widespread sophisticated 
implementation.114  
III. A COMPARATIVE STUDY: CLICKWRAP AGREEMENTS V. SMART 
CONTRACTS  
The introduction of smart contracts is not the first time the legal 
community has been faced with the question of whether or not to enforce 
electronic contracts. The concept of electronic contracts first surfaced with 
clickwrap agreements.115  
Clickwrap agreements are agreements that “require a user to 
affirmatively click a box on the website acknowledging agreement to the 
terms of service, which are often available in a scrolling text box, before the 
user is allowed to proceed.”116 In reality, these agreements are rarely read 
by any user, yet they are legal.117 Courts view such agreements as a 
necessary evil.118 During the early stages of acceptance for clickwrap 
                                                 
111. Kasey Panetta, Why Blockchain’s Smart Contracts Aren’t Ready for the Business World, 
GARTNER (June 26, 2017), https://www.gartner.com/smarterwithgartner/why-blockchains-smart-contra 
cts-arent-ready-for-the-business-world/ [https://perma.cc/AF96-Y7FZ]. 
112. See Szabo, supra notes 2 & 17.  
113. See Frances Coppola, Ethereum’s DAO Hacking Shows That Coders Are Not Infallible, 
FORBES (Jun 20, 2016 09:24 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/francescoppola/2016/06/20/the-dao-ha 
cking-shows-that-coders-are-not-infallible/#2c236e533983 [https://perma.cc/PU2T-QXU2] (discussing 
the lessons learned from the DAO hack including the misplaced trust in the coders of the DAO).  
114. Many people believe that in order to protect Ethereum blockchain, smart contracts must be 
tested and certified. See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 88.  
115. Clickwrap contracts are the technology-based predecessor of shrinkwrap contracts. 
According to Judge Easterbrook, “[t]he ‘shrinkwrap license’ gets its name from the fact that retail 
software packages are covered in plastic or cellophane ‘shrinkwrap.’” ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 
F.3d 1447, 1449 (7th Cir. 1996). Shrinkwrap contracts can contain licenses that “become effective as 
soon as the customer tears the wrapping from the package.” Id. Although “shrinkwrap” contracts were 
the precursor to “clickwrap” contracts, this Note will refer to the electronic version, clickwrap 
agreements, as a term that encompasses both concepts.  
116. Alison S. Brehm & Cathy D. Lee, From the Chair: “Click Here to Accept the Terms of 
Service,” AM. BAR ASS’N (Jan. 2015) [https://perma.cc/K37Y-JLD9]. 
117. See infra text accompanying note 122.  
118. Michael R. Overly, Legal quicksand: Shrink-wrap and click-wrap agreements, CSO (Aug. 
2, 2011, 8:00 AM), https://www.csoonline.com/article/2129174/compliance/legal-quicksand--shrink-
wrap-and-click-wrap-agreements.html [https://perma.cc/H9R5-D5BN]. See also ProCD, Inc., 86 F.3d 
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agreements, public backlash revolved around the importance of clarity and 
fairness.119 Often, clickwrap agreements struggled with the requirement for 
mutual assent: were both parties really aware of the contractual terms?120  
Despite the mutual assent concerns, it soon became apparent that without 
clickwrap agreements, contracting via the internet would be unenforceable. 
This would have put an end to the now very popular form of contracting—
online shopping. Courts quickly began to reason that the terms in clickwrap 
agreements were no different from regular contracts. This reasoning allows 
courts to utilize the same traditional legal analysis when deciding whether 
clickwrap agreements are legally binding.121   
Sometimes clickwrap agreements were upheld even when users 
acknowledged that they did not read the clickwrap contract. In these cases, 
the contract is still legally binding because the user clicked the 
“acknowledge” box. Essentially courts have found that when the user 
clicked the box, the user assented to the website’s required notice of the 
contract terms.122 Despite these seemingly unfair circumstances, the legal 
framework supports this version of notice and consent. For these reasons, 
the failure to read the terms of the clickwrap contract has not altered its 
enforceability.123 Such flexibility has given clickwrap agreements the 
leeway to exist within a necessary, albeit narrow, space.   
It is important to note that smart contracts, just like clickwrap 
agreements,124 will most likely face a heightened potential for similar 
abuses.125 Such abuses may include: lack of clarity in the contract’s terms 
                                                 
at 1447, 1451–52, (Judge Easterbrook expressing his concerns that if shrinkwrap agreements were not 
legally allowed to govern certain situations, then our transactions would be pushed back to the “horse-
and-buggy age”).  
119. See Brehm & Lee, supra note 116.  
120. Mutual assent is considered “the manifestation by both parties of an intent to be bound.” 
ASS’N OF CORP. COUNSEL, CONTRACTS 2.0: MAKING AND ENFORCING CONTRACTS ONLINE 6 (2012) 
[https://perma.cc/V7E8-WXFR].  
121. Brehm & Lee, supra note 116. See also Feldman v. Google, Inc., 513 F. Supp. 2d 229, 236 
(E.D. Pa. 2007) (“To determine whether a clickwrap agreement is enforceable, courts presented with the 
issue apply traditional principles of contract law and focus on whether the plaintiffs had reasonable 
notice of and manifested assent to the clickwrap agreement.”).  
122. Hancock v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 701 F.3d 1248, 1251 (10th Cir. 2012). 
See also Groff v. Am. Online, File No. C.A. No. PC 97-0331, 1998 WL 307001 (R.I. Super. Ct., May 
27, 1998) (finding that although the plaintiff did not comprehend the presence of a forum selection 
clause, a valid contract existed because the plaintiff consented to the terms by clicking the “I agree” 
button); Caspi v. Microsoft Network, L.L.C., 732 A.2d 528 (N.J. App. Div., July 2, 1999) (holding that 
a valid licensing agreement existed because each user was bound by Microsoft’s subscriber agreement 
when he or she clicked “I agree” to the terms of use button).  
123. Brehm & Lee, supra note 116.  
124. For more discussion regarding the potential abuses that clickwrap agreements face, see  
Overly, supra note 118.  
125. A recent example of a potential abuse coming to fruition is evident in the case Schnabel v. 
Trilegiant Corp., 697 F.3d 110, 126–31 (2d Cir. 2012). In Schnabel, website operators did not want to 
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and failure to provide adequate notice.126 Because the potential for these 
abuses exist, it may mean that smart contracts will face initial public 
uncertainty. However, this is similar to the initial uncertainty surrounding 
clickwrap agreements. All these potential abuses are impediments towards 
widespread acceptance and enforceability of smart contracts. However, 
clickwrap agreements were able to overcome the potential for abuse by 
existing within a narrow area of contracting—internet transactions. In the 
case of smart contracts, if the risk of abuse can be lessened by enacting these 
contracts in a narrow category of transactions, it is likely that traditional 
legal standards will embrace smart contracts, just as they did with clickwrap 
agreements.127  
IV. A CHANGING FRONTIER: EMERGING STATE ACCEPTANCE OF SMART 
CONTRACTS  
Recently, regulation of blockchain technology has become a central 
theme surrounding the implementation of smart contracts.128 Despite all the 
debate and scholarship, there are no federal regulations specifically 
addressing blockchain technology or smart contracts.129 Unlike the federal 
government, some state governments have taken the lead in embracing 
                                                 
deter potential site users by forcing them to assent to a clickwrap agreement. As a result, the website 
decided to skip the “I accept” button, which, in effect, failed to give users the required notice and consent. 
Schnabel, 697 F.3d at 130. This case provides a helpful reminder that despite the legal system’s favorable 
perspective regarding clickwrap agreements, courts will still invalidate such an agreement if it is 
considered abusive or lacks the key requirements for general contracting. See Richard Raysman, 
Enforceability of Clickwrap Agreements Called into Question-Checklist for Best Practices in Electronic 
Contracting, HOLLAND & KNIGHT (Nov. 7, 2012), https://www.hklaw.com/digitaltechblog/Enforceabil 
ity-of-Clickwrap-Agreement-Called-into-Question----Checklist-for-Best-Practices-in-Electronic-Contr 
acting-11-07-2012/ [https://perma.cc/Z3T4-GU88]. 
126. For a description addressing the lack of notice as a potential abuse for clickwrap agreements, 
see Brehm & Lee, supra note 116 (“The enforcement of [clickwrap] agreements turns . . . [on] whether 
the party had constructive notice of the terms of the agreement and thus agreed to be bound by them.”).  
127. For an argument that traditional contract law can be easily adapted to evaluate and enforce 
smart contracts, see Raskin, supra note 27, at 322–29. See also supra note 14 (discussing current projects 
which mimic Szabo’s idea for smart property and therefore can be easily adapted to smart contracting) 
and supra note 16 (discussing additional fields that could benefit from the use of blockchain based smart 
contracts).  
128. For more perspectives regarding regulation of blockchain-type technology, and thus smart 
contracts, see Carla L. Reyes, Article: Moving beyond Bitcoin to an Endogenous Theory of Decentralized 
Ledger Technology Regulation: An Initial Proposal, 61 VILL. L. REV. 191 (2016); AARON WRIGHT & 
PRIMAVERA DE FILIPPI, DECENTRALIZED BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY AND THE RISE OF LEX 
CRYPTOGRAPHIA (Mar. 10, 2015) [https://perma.cc/8CUT-5WFN]; Primavera De Filippi & Samer 
Hassan, Blockchain technology as a regulatory technology: From code is law to law is code, FIRST 
MONDAY (Dec. 5, 2016) [https://perma.cc/WAF2-K5WP]; Joanna Diane Caytas, Blockchain in the U.S. 
Regulatory Setting: Evidentiary Use in Vermont, Delaware, and Elsewhere, COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. 
REV. (May 30, 2017).  
129. Caytas, supra note 128, § III(A). See infra Part VI covering a discussion regarding the need 
for and broader implications of regulating smart contracts.  
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smart contracts. The first trendsetters include: Arizona, Delaware, Illinois, 
and Nevada.130  
A. Arizona  
In March 2017, Arizona amended the Arizona Electronic Transaction 
Act131 with the purpose of granting electronic form records and signatures 
                                                 
130. Jeffrey Neuburger, Arizona Passes Groundbreaking Blockchain and Smart Contract Law – 
State Blockchain Laws on the Rise, NEW MEDIA AND TECH. L. BLOG (Apr. 20, 2017), https://perma. 
cc/E8Z8-HRB5. Other states have instituted laws regarding blockchain technology. Hawaii passed a 
House Draft of H.B. 1481 on January 25, 2017. This bill is similar to Illinois’s Blockchain initiative. 
See infra Part IV.C. H.B. 1481 was sent to Hawaii’s Senate for review and awaits a vote. H.B. 1481, 
29th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2017), https://perma.cc/59ZX-LAD5 (last visited Aug. 22, 2018). 
Additionally, New York has passed blockchain legislation; however, this legislation is not statewide. 
Rather, New York was the first state to regulate via rulemaking. As a result of these rules, licenses are 
now required for businesses dealing in virtual currency in New York. A few bills were introduced in the 
New York legislature; however, they failed to pass with the requisite votes. These bills focused on using 
blockchain technology to protect voter records (A.B. 8792), define blockchain and recognize the validity 
of blockchain signatures (A.B. 8780), and create initiatives to study the benefits and promote the use of 
blockchain technology (A.B. 8793, A.B. 8783, A.B. 9685). A.B. 8792, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 
2017); A.B. 8780, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2017); A.B. 8793, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2017); 
A.B. 8783, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2017); A.B. 9685, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2018). 
Additionally, Nebraska is another state that has seen some movement regarding blockchain laws. 
Although not yet passed, Nebraska has proposed a law that would prohibit local municipalities from 
regulating blockchain technology (L.B. 694). L.B. 694, 105th Leg., 2nd Sess. (Neb. 2018). West Virginia 
is also looking to use blockchain technology in novel and creative ways. West Virginia piloted a program 
which allowed absentee military voters to use a mobile app, driven by blockchain technology, to cast 
their vote. This program was used in the November 8, 2018 statewide election. Terry Nguyen, West 
Virginia to offer mobile blockchain voting app for overseas voters in November election, WASH. POST 
(Aug. 10, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2018/08/10/west-virginia-pilots-mobile-
blockchain-voting-app-overseas-voters-november-election [https://perma.cc/93L6-9EHF]. See also 
Makena Kelly, Nearley 150 West Virginians voted with a mobile blockchain app, THE VERGE (Nov. 10, 
2018 2:00 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2018/11/10/18080518/blockchain-voting-mobile-app-west-
virginia-voatz; West Virginia Not Planning to Expand Use of Blockchain Voting, GOV’T TECH. (Nov. 9, 
2018), http://www.govtech.com/products/West-Virginia-Not-Planning-to-Expand-Use-of-Blockchain-
Voting.html.  
Even though some states have embraced blockchain technology, others states, such as Florida and 
Maine, have failed to pass similar legislation. Florida H.B. 1357 allowed “electronic credentialing,” and 
later blockchain applications for licensing and titling of vehicles. The Florida law would have also 
upheld contracts that utilized an electronic record containing a smart contract term. H.B. 1357, 2018 
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2018). Much like Florida’s law, Maine S.B. 950 also failed to pass the legislature. 
The Maine law focused on creating a task force to study the possibilities of using blockchain technology 
in voting elections. S.B. 950, 128th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Me. 2017). Additionally, Vermont signed Act 51 
into law; but, the state reneged on this law just one year later. Despite this failure, Vermont has embraced 
blockchain technology in other avenues. Vermont’s Rules of Evidence, § 1913, holds that blockchain 
ledgers are considered “business records” under Evidence Rule 902. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1913 
(2016). Furthermore, Vermont’s S.B.135 allowed for a study into the benefits of blockchain. In May 
2018, Vermont’s S.B. 269 took the state’s blockchain laws one step further by defining “blockchain,” 
pushing for a study into the use of blockchain for government records, allowing for the creation of 
blockchain-based limited liability companies, and holding that any fact found on a blockchain is 
considered authentic. S.B. 269, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Vt. 2018). See also Caytas, supra note 128.  
131. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 44-7003 (2017).  
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the same enforceability as traditional forms and signatures.132 Essentially, 
this act gives legal effect to all electronic signatures on blockchain.133 The 
Arizona law is broad and does not require the use of any one platform.134 
The new law’s broad terms will allow the residents of Arizona to choose 
which blockchain platform to utilize—Ethereum, Bitcoin, etc.—while still 
giving the smart contracts legal effect.135 Additionally, Arizona has made 
further amendments to their blockchain regulations. The Arizona legislature 
recently cleared a law that allows individuals to run blockchain nodes from 
within their homes.136  
B. Delaware  
In addition to Arizona, Delaware is another state that has embraced 
blockchain technology. In July 2017, Delaware became the first state to 
implement blockchain technology by “legally recogniz[ing] . . . records . . . 
stored on a blockchain.”137 In effect, this new law allows companies to 
“keep their list of shareholders on a blockchain.”138 These exciting pieces 
of legislation are just the start for Delaware.139 After signing the bill into 
                                                 
132. Neuburger, supra note 130. For all states passing blockchain-friendly legislation one glaring 
question remains: Does the Federal E-Sign Act preempt a state’s push to embrace blockchain and smart 
contracts? Id. The Federal E-Sign Act gives legal effect to electronic signatures. There is an ongoing 
concern that the Federal E-Sign Act preempts a state’s own blockchain initiatives. When Arizon, and 
many other states, adopted blockchain friendly legislation, Arizona did so by amending their version of 
the UETA to include blockchain-based records under the definition of electronic records. Riley Svikhart, 
Essay: Blockchain’s Big Hurdle, STAN. L. REV. (Nov 2017), https://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/ 
blockchains-big-hurdle/. For more discussion on federal legislation governing blockchain technologies, 
see infra Part V. 
133. Aaron Stanley, Only in Arizona: How Smart Contract Clarity is Winning Over Startups, 
COINDESK (Sept. 19, 2017, 11:40 AM), https://www.coindesk.com/arizona-smart-contract-clarity-winn 
ing-startups [https://perma.cc/M8CT-B7YF]. 
134. Id.  
135. Id. This article also speculates that Arizona’s new law will make the state an increasingly 
popular place for start-up companies.  
136. H.B. 2602, 53rd Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess., §§ 9-500.42, 11-269.22 (Ariz. 2018). In March 2018, 
Tennessee followed Arizona’s lead and enacted a similar law which allows both blockchain technology 
and smart contracts to be used for electronic transactions. Additionally, the Tennessee law (S.B.1662) 
protects the data stored on a blockchain by protecting different ownership rights. S.B. 1662, 2018 Leg., 
Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2018). 
137. Michael del Castillo, Delaware House Passes Historic Blockchain Regulation, COINDESK 
(July 1, 2017), https://www.coindesk.com/delaware-house-passes-historic-blockchain-regulation [https: 
//perma.cc/3PWG-Q3PU]. 
138. S.B. 69, 149th Gen. Assemb. (Del. 2017). See Jeff John Roberts, Why Delaware Made it 
Easier for Businesses to Use Blockchain, FORTUNE (Aug. 22, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/08/22/for 
tune-500-blockchain-ledger-delaware/ [https://perma.cc/H6WE-WVF3].  
139. Symbiont is the company responsible for supplying this blockchain technology to Delaware. 
“If successful, the tools will provide an efficient new way for companies to undertake anything from 
proxy votes to share splits. Firms will also be able to use the cryptographic features built into the 
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law, then-Governor Jack Markell of Delaware appointed an Ombudsperson 
and legal ambassador to the blockchain initiative140 and asked the Delaware 
State Bar Association’s Corporate Law Council to consider recognizing 
shares on a distributed ledger.141 Additionally, Delaware’s state government 
is required to use the blockchain technology for their public records.142 
Approximately sixty-six percent of Fortune 500 companies and eighty-five 
percent of initial public offerings are incorporated in Delaware.143 Given 
these statistics, Delaware’s new law has the potential to spur widespread 
effects.144     
C. Illinois 
In addition to Arizona and Delaware, Illinois has joined the group of 
states that are expanding their laws to make room for blockchain 
technology. Illinois started by creating a consortium of state and county 
agencies to make up the Illinois Blockchain Initiative.145 The goal of this 
new Initiative is to “determine if this groundbreaking technology can be 
leveraged to create more efficient, integrated and trusted state services, 
while providing a welcoming environment for the Blockchain 
community.”146 In August 2017, the Illinois Blockchain Initiative started to 
test a blockchain-based system for digitalizing birth certificates. The goal 
for this program is to create technological tools that will allow both parents 
                                                 
blockchain to provide regulators or investors with secure temporary access to confidential documents 
on a case-by-case basis.” Roberts, supra note 138.  
140. In addition to providing an Ombudsman and ambassador, Delaware is working to make the 
new switch to blockchain technology straightforward. All of the records will remain easily accessible 
via a website; meanwhile, all of the blockchain technology will still happen on the back-end. This will 
not only help with the transition, but it will also keep the learning curve low, making corporations more 
likely to adapt this technology. Id.  
141. Andrea Tinianow et al., Delaware’s 2017 Resolution: Make Blockchain a Reality, COINDESK 
(Jan 3, 2017 15:30 UTC), https://www.coindesk.com/what-expect-delaware-blockchain-initiative-2017/ 
[https://perma.cc/LTZ7-2Z44].  
142. Andrea Tinianow & Caitlin Long, Delaware Blockchain Initiative: Transforming the 
Foundational Infrastructure of Corporate Finance, HARVARD LAW SCH. FORUM ON CORP. 
GOVERNANCE AND FIN. REGULATION (Mar 16, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/03/16/dela 
ware-blockchain-initiative-transforming-the-foundational-infrastructure-of-corporate-finance/ [https:// 
perma.cc/D2SG-7SSJ]. This initiative began with the Delaware Public Archives project. “The Public 
Archives project . . . uses smart records to automate compliance with the state’s document retention and 
destruction laws and create a means by which the Delaware Public Archives can generate new revenue 
streams.” Tinianow et al., supra note 141.  
143. Tinianow et al., supra note 141.  
144. In addition to widespread effects, this new blockchain initiative could be very advantageous 
for corporations incorporated in Delaware. Such benefits include: saving money in record keeping and 
transaction costs and faster auditing processes and due diligence procedures. Roberts, supra note 138.  
145. Blockchain in Illinois, ILL. DEP’T OF INNOVATION & TECH., https://www2.illinois.gov/sites/ 
doit/pages/BlockChainInitiative.aspx [https://perma.cc/TSX7-FV8J]. 
146. Id.  
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and doctors to instantly register the child’s birth on a permissioned 
blockchain.147 Under such a program, state officials will then be able to 
automatically verify a person’s registration and “cryptographically sign data 
related to a person’s name, date of birth, blood type, and other details.”148 
Using this blockchain-based registration system means that the personal 
data will be stored on a permissioned “tamper-proof” distributed ledger that 
can only be accessed by those with the appropriate cryptographic key.149 
Although Illinois’s pilot program is focused on digitizing and utilizing 
blockchain technology for the personal registration process, the tools that 
are developed for this program could aid the advancement of blockchain 
technology and smart contracting in other arenas.   
D. Nevada  
Nevada is yet another state that has begun to embrace blockchain 
technology. In June 2017, Nevada adopted a law that provides guidelines 
for the use of blockchain technology.150 The purpose of this legislation is to 
“block[] local government entities from taxing, licensing and imposing 
other requirements on blockchain use.”151 This means that local 
governments and entities are not allowed to impose taxes or fees on parties 
using blockchain technology or smart contracts.152 Furthermore, Nevada’s 
law fully embraces electronic signatures recorded on blockchain by 
considering blockchain technology to be an electronic record protected 
under Nevada’s UETA.153 Nevada’s legislation is similar to Arizona’s bill; 
however, unlike Arizona, Nevada actually places specific restrictions on 
taxing and licensing that impede the use of blockchain-based technology.154 
These regulations, embraced by many Nevada-based business leaders,155 
                                                 
147. Joshua Althauser, Illinois Government Pilots Blockchain Technology for Birth Certificate 
Digitization, COINTELEGRAPH (Sept. 2, 2017), https://cointelegraph.com/news/illinois-government-
pilots-blockchain-technology-for-birth-certificate-digitization [https://perma.cc/5D7G-3WXE]. See 
Michael del Castillo, Illinois Launches Blockchain Pilot to Digitize Birth Certificates, COINDESK (Aug. 
31, 2017), https://www.coindesk.com/illinois-launches-blockchain-pilot-digitize-birth-certificates [http 
s://perma.cc/2RGP-42TM]. 
148. Del Castillo, supra note 147.  
149. Id.  
150. Michael Scott, Nevada Takes a Chance on Pro-Blockchain Legislation, BITCOIN MAG. (June 
13, 2017, 2:53 PM), https://bitcoinmagazine.com/articles/nevada-takes-chance-pro-blockchain-legislati 
on/ [https://perma.cc/X5KQ-2GR9]. 
151. Id.  
152. NEV. REV. STAT. § 268.0979 (2017).  
153. See S.B. 398, 2017 Leg., 79th Reg. Sess. (Nev. 2017) (defining blockchain and incorporating 
blockchain based technology into the already existing definition of an electronic record).  
154. S.B. 398, 2017 Leg. 79th Reg. Sess. §§ 4, 6 (Nev. 2017).  
155. For example, Allison Clift-Jennings, founder of Filament, was pleased with Nevada’s 
specific regulations because they “put[] the state at an advantage, in that it clearly and succinctly outlines 
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suggest that states are taking more of an active role toward not only 
embracing blockchain technology but also regulating the use of such 
technology. 
V. UETA AND ESIGN: A BARE MINIMUM FOR FEDERAL REGULATION 
With respect to blockchain acceptance, it is clear that there have been 
advances on the state level; however, federal law remains stagnant. In 
analyzing the widespread applicability of smart contracts, it is important to 
discuss the direction in which the country is headed.  
At this moment, the applicable acts are Uniform Electronic Transactions 
Act (UETA)156 and Electronic Signatures in Global National Commerce Act 
(ESIGN).157 The purpose behind both the UETA and ESIGN is to provide a 
digital signature with the same validity and enforceability that a traditional 
signature enjoys.158 It is important to note that, in ESIGN, Congress has 
allowed states to preempt either ESIGN with UETA or vice versa.159 
Essentially, Congress has granted states great deference to choose whether 
UETA or ESIGN best fits each state’s individual goals. Such deference 
should not be ignored.160 Because of this generous federal leeway, states 
                                                 
not so much what the state will do, but what the state will not do, when it comes to blockchain 
regulation.” Scott, supra note 150. Filament is a Reno-based company that encourages the use of 
blockchain based technology for industrial use. Id.  
156. UETA is a Uniform Act that was proposed by the National Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws in 1999. For more information on the UETA, see Uniform Electronic Transactions 
Act, UNIF. LAW COMM’N (1999), http://uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Electronic%20Transactions% 
20Act [https://perma.cc/6DLW-CJY5]. 
157. Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, Pub. L. No. 106–229, 114 Stat. 
464 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. § 96). ESIGN was passed on June 30, 2000, 
and is the federal law equivalent of the UETA.  
158. Id.  
159. See ESIGN § 120(a). See also Patricia Brumfield Fry, A Preliminary Analysis of Federal and 
State Electronic Commerce Laws, UNIF. LAW COMM’N, http://www.uniformlaws.org/Narrative.aspx?tit 
le=UETA%20and%20Preemption%20Article [https://perma.cc/6VU8-UW9Y] (discussing the 
parameters of ESIGN and UETA preemption).  
160. Alan Cohn et al., Steptoe Blockchain Blog: The Enforceability of Smart Contracts, STEPTOE 
& JOHNSON LLP (May 4, 2017), https://www.steptoeblockchainblog.com/2017/05/the-enforceability-
of-smart-contracts/ [https://perma.cc/56VJ-UUKN] (discussing ESIGN’s preemption clause and 
congressional intent for a state to use either UETA or ESIGN in order to recognize and preserve the 
validity of an electronic signature). Although the UETA and ESIGN exist on the federal level, it is 
important to remember that the rare pieces of federal regulation that mention blockchain do so 
tangentially. See How Congress is Impacting Blockchain and Crypto Regulation, POLYSWARM, 
https://medium.com/polyswarm/how-congress-is-impacting-blockchain-and-crypto-regulation-an-over 
view-1db43824e903 [https://perma.cc/SQT4-AWM6] (citing congressional bills that mention 
blockchain or cryptocurrencies, a tangential relation, and finding that these bills are mostly for defense 
purposes). However, on the state level the situation is different. Certain states have chosen to regulate 
based on their willingness to cultivate an evolving technology-savvy community. It is evident that states 
remain free to regulate as they wish. The federal government has been slow to embrace the different 
states’ regulations and tends to take a rather “hands-off” approach. See Congressional Blockchain 
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have been able to adopt laws that are friendlier toward the acceptance of 
blockchain-based technology.161  
Both UETA and ESIGN treat digital signatures as the equivalent of 
traditional signatures. Although neither the UETA nor ESIGN contains 
specific mention of blockchain-based technology, the mere fact that these 
acts apply to digital signatures means they have the potential to also apply 
to blockchain-based smart contracts.162 As discussed earlier, parties to a 
smart contract agree on the terms via a cryptographic key.163 This 
cryptographic key is akin to a traditional signature. Each party has its own 
cryptographic key, thus making it virtually impossible for the contract to be 
forged. In addition to the cryptographic key, a party also needs intent to sign 
a smart contract. Some courts have found that “Thanks” plus a manual 
signature in an email creates a binding legal signature.164 This finding 
                                                 
Caucus vision statement, CONG. BLOCKCHAIN CAUCUS, https://www.congressionalblockchaincaucus. 
com [https://perma.cc/YP 9A-TQPT] (“As a Caucus, we have decided on a hands-off regulatory 
approach, believing that this technology will best evolve the same way the internet did; on its own.”). 
This is somewhat unusual behavior. Typically, the federal government exercises their preemptive power 
to regulate technologies affecting the financial sector. See Caytas, supra note 128, § III(A). Although 
blockchain technology can affect the financial industry, the federal government has yet to regulate it. 
Perhaps this lack of federal regulation suggests the following: the technology is too novel and the 
potential markets that blockchain technology touches and smart contracts govern are evolving at a pace 
too rapid to regulate. For these reasons, it is possible that the federal government is simply embracing 
an age-old federalism perspective. Under this perspective, the federal government allows the states to 
act as “laboratories” testing out different regulation models. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 
U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., conc.) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a 
single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and 
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”). Potentially, after viewing each state’s 
regulation legislation, the federal government could enact procedures that apply on a national level. As 
society becomes more electronic and new technologies and uses for those technologies are created, like 
blockchain and smart contracts, this dialogue between the federal and state governments could signify 
an important future trend. For arguments that oppose the recent influx of state legislation on blockchain, 
see Mike Orcutt, States That Are Passing Laws to Govern “Smart Contracts” Have No Idea What 
They’re Doing, MIT TECH. REV. (March 29, 2018), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/610718/stat 
es-that-are-passing-laws-to-govern-smart-contracts-have-no-idea-what-theyre-doing/ [https://perma.cc/ 
MYB4-4W7D] (arguing that smart contracts and blockchain technology are so novel and unknown that 
the different states’ legislation will only make future enforcement harder). See also Amy Davine Kim & 
Perianne Boring, State-by-State Smart Contract Laws? If it Ain’t Broke, Don’t Fix It, COINDESK (Feb. 
26, 2018 9:00 AM), https://www.coindesk.com/state-state-smart-contract-laws-aint-broke-dont-fix [htt 
ps://perma.cc/294W-8R42] (arguing that state legislation will create confusion; however federal laws 
ESIGN and UETA are the best mechanisms to regulate smart contracts and blockchain).  
161. Supra Part IV. 
162. For an example of a state amending its UETA to include blockchain records under the 
definition of electronic records, thus granting signatures on blockchain records the same UETA 
protections as other electronic signatures, see the discussion regarding Nevada S.B. 398 supra Part IV.D. 
This provides a helpful example of what could occur on the federal level.  
163. Supra Part I.C. 
164. Cohn et al., supra note 160. See also Roger Edwards, LLC v. Fiddes & Son, Ltd., 245 F. 
Supp. 2d 251, 261 (D. Me. 2003) (finding that emails containing a salutation constituted a signature that 
met ESIGN requirements found in 15 U.S.C § 7001(a)).  
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indicates that the courts are willing to accept a broad definition of what 
constitutes a signature. A broad definition creates a rather low bar for 
showing the existence of mutual assent in a smart contract. The UETA’s 
rather lax signature requirement could potentially make it easier for a court 
to find smart contracts legally binding.165   
Despite the lack of specific blockchain laws and regulations on the 
federal level,166 it is possible for a court to interpret the federal law in a 
manner that embraces blockchain-based technology.  
VI. THE VIABILITY OF SMART CONTRACTS IN THE LEGAL ARENA AND 
POSSIBLE FUTURE IMPLEMENTATION IN A CONTROLLED BUSINESS 
ENVIRONMENT  
The invention of blockchain technology is exciting because it has opened 
the door to many potential uses and applications. The prime example is 
smart contracts, which utilizes the new blockchain technology to 
revolutionize traditional contracting. Of course, it is fun to imagine the 
world ten years into the future. Perhaps, with the help of both smart 
contracts and smart property,167 making a trip to the store to purchase 
laundry detergent may be a thing of the past.168 Despite all the excitement, 
it is important to consider whether society should move toward total 
implementation of smart contracts. Are smart contracts really as great as 
they sound? The idea of a smart contract is to cut out the middleman. 
Without the middleman, contracting is more efficient and cost-effective. 
However, does all this efficiency come at a cost? In this case, the cost would 
be the loss of the benefits the middleman offers.169 A middleman has the 
                                                 
165. For a supporting argument, see Cohn et al., supra note 160.  
166. It is important to note that, although the federal government has not yet begun to regulate 
blockchain-based smart contracts, some federal agencies, like the SEC, have recently started to discuss 
regulating cryptocurrencies, a digital form of currency that utilizes blockchain. The SEC Chairman, Jay 
Clayton, discussed the SEC’s role in monitoring cryptocurrencies on February 6, 2018. See Chairman’s 
Testimony on Virtual Currencies: The Roles of the SEC and CFTC Before the S. Comm. On Banking, 
Hous., and Urban Affairs, 115th Cong. (2018) (statement of Jay Clayton, Chairman, Securities and 
Exchange Commission), https://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/testimony-virtual-currencies-oversight-
role-us-securities-and-exchange-commission [https://perma.cc/G25T-CCRN]. On March 7, 2018, the 
SEC warned investors about “unregistered” online platforms being used to buy, sell, and trade tokens 
sold in recent Initial Coin Offerings (“ICOs”). See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, STATEMENT ON 
POTENTIALLY UNLAWFUL ONLINE PLATFORMS FOR TRADING DIGITAL ASSETS (2018) [https://perma.cc 
/9T49-JKRF]. Perhaps, the SEC’s recent focus on regulating cryptocurrencies might soon turn the 
federal government’s attention towards regulating blockchain.  
167. See supra note 14.  
168. See supra note 4. For more on the potential changes, see Szabo, supra note 17.  
169. See Hans Rudolf Trüeb, Smart Contracts, WALDERWYSS, 704–06 (mentioning that because 
smart contracts offer a higher level of trust and security, many people hope that the use of a smart 
contract will eventually eliminate the need for a middleman), https://www.walderwyss.com/publicatio 
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potential to provide an advising and auditing role in any given transaction.170 
Without the middleman, this advice is lost, which could increase the 
probability of negative legal consequences.  
Furthermore, smart contracts may inadvertently place the contracting 
parties at greater risk for technological glitches.171 Unfortunately, it is not 
uncommon for technology to experience occasional malfunctions. Although 
smart contracts are deemed “impenetrable,” this may only be true because 
the technology is so novel.172 On a more realistic note, it is most likely only 
a matter of time before a hacker can do something malfeasant with 
blockchain-type technology. The June 2016 DAO hack173 is an important 
reminder of why society should proceed with caution when implementing 
smart contracts. Just like society’s caution when approaching clickwrap 
agreements, it is important to replicate similar apprehension when dealing 
with smart contracts. Even though clickwrap agreements eventually found 
success, these electronic agreements have remained acceptable in a rather 
limited set of scenarios.174 For these reasons, smart contracts will most 
likely be utilized for specific scenarios as opposed to achieving success 
within all facets of life.175   
                                                 
ns/2278.pdf [https://perma.cc/PL3S-3VL9]; MCKINLAY ET AL., supra note 32, at 5 (discussing how the 
use of blockchain in smart contracts means that a typical intermediary is not necessary); Finley supra 
note 87 (suggesting that some of the issues caused by the 2016 DAO hack could have been avoided if 
the human element—the middleman—was not removed).  
170. For example, take the interaction between a lawyer and client. In some instances the lawyer 
could be seen as a middleman. In a future where smart contracts are widespread, a client contracting to 
purchase land, or even a company, might choose to use a smart contract. If the client chose to contract 
via a smart contract, the need for a lawyer (i.e. the middleman in this scenario) would be eliminated. 
Consequently, the client foregoes the lawyer’s auditing and advising role; thus, the client could 
potentially place themselves at a higher risk for bad business decisions and/or legal ramifications.  
171. See GOVERNMENT TECHNOLOGY, supra note 130 (highlighting the security concern 
surrounding the use of the blockchain-based absentee voting application, Voatz, in future elections).  
172. It is important to remember that the code used to create the DAO involved in the June 2016 
hack was immature. Numerous experienced coders reviewed the lines and still failed to spot the error in 
time. In hindsight, some think the coding error was rather basic; however, no one thought to look for an 
error that minor. See Price, supra note 87; Finley, supra note 87. It follows that once the technology is 
used more frequently, others will learn from past mistakes and check their codes for similar errors. Over 
time the technology will become stronger. But minor errors and their amendments—which ultimately 
help strengthen the technology—may prove that smart contracts were not as initially impenetrable as 
once thought.  
173. Supra Part II.D.  
174. Overly, supra note 118.  
175. See also WRIGHT & DE FILIPPI, supra note 128, at 8 (arguing that smart contract uses include 
financial sector and the regulation of governments and voting systems); Reggie O’Shields, Article: 
Smart Contracts: Legal Agreements for the Blockchain, 21 N.C. BANKING INST. 177, 178 (2017) 
(suggesting that smart contracts may have been overhyped); Not-So-Clever Contracts, THE ECONOMIST: 
SCHUMPETER (July 28, 2016), https://www.economist.com/news/business/21702758-time-being-least-
human-judgment-still-better-bet-cold-hearted [https://perma.cc/4A76-5G5T] (arguing that rather than 
hypothesizing when, if, or how smart contracts will replace humans, this type of legal advancement is 
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Before smart contracts can be fully implemented, even if only within the 
narrow category of sophisticated business transactions, there needs to exist 
a function in which to regulate smart contracts. Currently, there are no 
federal laws specific to smart contracts, which means there is no formal 
regulation.176 Because of this, smart contracts have fluid concepts regarding 
their legally enforceable parameters. As discussed previously, one of the 
major burdens faced by those injured in the DAO hack is anonymity and 
failure to identify a defendant.177 Traditionally, when a case lacks an 
identifiable defendant, courts tend to shy away from both adjudicating and 
awarding damages.178 Although regulation could stipulate how such 
circumstance might be handled in the court system, there is currently 
nothing of this sort. Without any enforceable legal framework governing 
and regulating smart contracts, society lacks a way to formulate, implement, 
and execute smart contracts. In the wake of a breach, the lack of legally 
enforceable parameters—coupled with the anonymity that blockchain 
offers—means the injured party is left to fend for themselves. This is an 
unsettling thought because it bucks the most primary notions of fairness and 
equality which the American justice system was designed to protect.179 For 
these reasons, it is becoming evident that smart contracts require some form 
of regulation before widespread implementation can be achieved.180  
Although regulation is required for widespread use, there are some 
drawbacks. For example, the purpose behind blockchain technology is 
similar to the purpose behind the advent of the internet. Both were created 
with an emphasis on promoting free expression and exchange of ideas.181 
                                                 
best situated in sophisticated organizations, such as banks); Panetta, supra note 111 (suggesting that the 
world is not ready for smart contracts to govern all avenues of daily life).  
176. In addition to the lack of federal regulation regarding smart contracts, there is also minimal 
case law discussing the blockchain-based technology. Although several cases mention blockchain, only 
one case specifically mentions blockchain technology within the context of a smart contract, albeit in a 
footnote. See In re Dole Food Co. Stockholder Litig., Consolidated C.A. No. 8703-VCL, 2017 WL 
624843, at *4 n.1 (Del. Ch. Feb. 15, 2017); Caytas, supra note 128. 
177. Supra Part II.D.  
178. Supra note 106.  
179. See Larry A. DiMatteo, The Norms of Contract: The Fairness Inquiry and the “Law of 
Satisfaction”—A Nonunified Theory, 24 HOFSTRA L. REV. 349, 368–69 (1995) (explaining that contract 
law has come to embrace these norms of fairness and equality through the recognition of new equitable 
concepts, such as good faith, unconscionability, and promissory estoppel in modern contract theory).  
180. For an example of the continued issues smart contracts face, see Jared Butcher, Steptoe 
Blockchain Blog: My Smart Contract Just Ate $14 Million—Now What? Re-Thinking indemnification 
for smart contract risks, STEPTOE & JOHNSON LLP (June 12, 2017), https://www.steptoeblockchain 
blog.com/2017/06/my-smart-contract-just-ate-14-million-now-what-re-thinking-indemnification-for-
smart-contract-risks/ [https://perma.cc/WER7-54ZZ]. For an argument proposing regulation of 
blockchain, see Reyes, supra note 128.  
181. For a similar perspective on the problems we face in regulating blockchain technology, see  
WRIGHT & DE FILIPPI, supra note 128, at 45–46. 
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However, if this technology is regulated, as is necessary for widespread use, 
this “free” exchange of ideas will be sacrificed.  
Blockchain was created to be decentralized and is often used in 
connection with smart contracts, which are a self-regulating tool.182 As 
previously discussed, the nodes are a self-checking and self-regulating 
mechanism. A new block may only be added once the majority of the nodes 
have reached a consensus.183 Thus, this process of self-regulation mimics 
the same process of a democratic vote. Therefore, even the idea of 
regulating blockchain, in which someone outside of the nodes would have 
a say regarding how the blockchain operates, goes against its initial design. 
Why waste time regulating something that was created with the purpose of 
being self-regulating? As evident by the DAO hack, one suggested response 
is that the self-regulating aspect is not perfect. On the other hand, it could 
be argued that because the DAO hack was only made possible due to an 
immature contractual clause within the smart contract, not the blockchain, 
why not regulate smart contracts themselves? Similar to the response in 
opposition to regulating blockchain, regulating smart contracts also runs 
perpendicular to a key aspect of smart contracting. Smart contracts were 
created with the purpose of cutting out the middleman; however, this is only 
possible through the use of the quasi-democratic self-regulating process, as 
opposed to government regulating process, that blockchain offers. Both 
blockchain and smart contracts were initially intended to be self-
regulating;184 however, these questions suggest that government regulation 
of either blockchain or smart contracts requires regulation of the other. 
Thus, if widespread use is desired, it may be necessary for the government 
to regulate concepts that were meant to be self-regulating.  
Future implementation seems to require the regulation of both smart 
contracts and blockchain. There are two specific components of a smart 
contract that would be best suited for regulation. First, regulation should 
require smart contracts to utilize a permissioned ledger. Second, regulation 
needs to target the mutuality component of a smart contract.  
Smart contracts should be required to incorporate only the permissioned 
version of a blockchain ledger. As discussed previously, anonymity can 
                                                 
182. See Trüeb, supra note 169, at 705.  
183. See supra Part I.C.  
184. See Blockchain Regulation and Smart Contracts, GETSMARTER, https://www.getsmarter.co 
m/presentations/uk/oxford-said/blockchain-regulation-and-smart-contracts (describing the self-
executing process of blockchain and finding smart contracts to be “self-executing”). See also, Giovanni 
Perani, Blockchain: is self-regulation sufficient?, MEDIUM (May 2), https://medium.com/coinmonks/ 
blockchain-is-self-regulation-sufficient-5bb68ac7e33f [https://perma.cc/8L4M-CMA7] (discussing the 
self-regulating nature of smart contracts and potential implications of regulation).  
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pose a serious issue for legal recourse.185 The only way to ensure that both 
parties are known is to use a protected permissioned ledger. Under this form 
of regulation, any party who contracts via a smart contract would be 
required to receive a special cryptographic key. Therefore, only those 
parties to the smart contract could access the ledger. All other parties would 
be barred. This regulation would create both transparency and identity.186 
Although regulating the type of distributed ledger used may remove some 
of the options available to smart contracting parties, this regulation 
preserves the opportunity to seek a legal remedy in the event of a breach. 
Moreover, parties contracting with each other typically want to know with 
whom they are contracting. For this reason, it is unlikely that a regulation 
requiring all smart contracts to use permissioned ledgers will face strong 
opposition.187  
In addition to requiring permissioned ledgers, regulation should also 
address the mutuality component of smart contracts. Traditional contracting 
makes use of the full spectrum of the English language. The situation is not 
so simple when smart contracts are involved. Because smart contracts use 
computer code, the contractual terms must be translated into the code.188 
However, because English words can encompass a variety of meanings to 
each contracting party, it is likely that neither party truly assents to what 
later becomes the translated terms of the smart contract. Without assent, 
mutuality between the parties never existed and the contracted terms are not 
enforceable. For this reason, mutuality requires regulation. Until computer 
coding becomes more advanced, one way to remedy the issue of mutuality 
is to require smart contracts to use a specific language.189 Although this 
removes some of the freedom to contract, it also ensures that each party is 
aware of what they are contracting for. With the help of one language 
specially designed for smart contracting purposes, each party can be sure of 
the contract’s terms. Thus, the smart contract achieves mutuality.190   
  
                                                 
185. For a discussion on the issues anonymity presents for legal enforcement, see supra Parts II.C, 
VI. 
186. For an example of the issues that may occur when the identity of the contracting parties are 
not known, see supra Part II.D.  
187. The Illinois legislation has instituted this type of permissioned ledger requirement when 
inputting birth certificate information on blockchain. See supra Part IV.C.  
188. For a discussion regarding the input of English terms into computer code, see supra Part II.A.  
189. CLACK is an example of a language created only for smart contracting. For more discussion 
regarding CLACK, see supra Part II.A.  
190. It should be noted that one downside to utilizing a specialized language is that the terms 
contracted for will mainly be those circumstances that are straightforward. The essence of creating a 
specialized contracting language is to use simple terms that have the same meaning to each party. 
Therefore, this option makes it difficult to draft contracts with highly complex terms.  
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CONCLUSION  
The acceptance and implementation of smart contracts presents many 
difficult paradoxes. Part I of this Note discussed the rather amorphous 
definition of a smart contract, the advent of blockchain and how this 
technology has aided the eventual creation of smart contracts. Additionally 
Part I further explored the specifics of blockchain technology and the 
different options for smart contracts, such as permissioned or permissionless 
ledgers. Part II examined the general issues impeding the implementation 
and enforcement of smart contracts. This section highlighted the DAO hack 
and explained how some of the concerns surrounding smart contracts came 
to fruition. Part III analogized the now commonly accepted internet 
contracts, clickwrap agreements, to the currently contested smart contracts. 
Further, Part III hypothesized that smart contracts will follow along the 
same path of acceptance that clickwrap agreements pursued. Part IV 
discussed a recent state legislation trend toward accepting blockchain 
technology and smart contracts. Part V mentioned the lack of federal 
regulation and proposed the interesting juxtaposition between the state and 
federal stances on regulation via UETA and ESIGN. Lastly, Part VI 
culminated in an analysis of smart contracts and what requirements need to 
be met in order to create widespread acceptance.  
This Note concludes that it is necessary to first decide how and in what 
manner to utilize smart contracts. Although smart contracts have the 
potential to be all-encompassing, the recent DAO hack stands as a warning 
to proceed with caution. Today, the technology is vulnerable and immature; 
therefore, smart contracts should only be utilized under certain 
circumstances. Even if smart contracts are relegated to a narrow realm of 
the legal arena, regulation is required to ensure fairness and equality to all 
the contracting parties. Although smart contracts are new and rapidly 
evolving, in order to provide adequate remedies our legal system requires, 
the law needs to deal with the aforementioned concerns before widespread 
acceptance can occur. 
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